To most, Chevron is an energy company that fuels the dreams of avid travelers or working Americans with long commutes. In the realm of law, however, Chevron only fueled a bloated administrative state during a feverish 40-year nightmare.
Many Americans have never heard of Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. This case, however, has had far-reaching impacts beyond just the Supreme Court’s 1984 term when it was decided.
In Chevron, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) determined that the Clean Air Act of 1970 included some vague terms, such as “stationary source.” The EPA assumed that Congress had given them authority to interpret what the terms meant and sought to make the final determination on their meaning. Chevron, however, challenged the EPA’s actions all the way to the Supreme Court.
The Court, ruling in favor of the EPA, held that agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes should receive deference over judge-made determinations as long as the agencies make their readings “reasonable.”
The regulatory state emerged victorious from the courtroom that day as the new doctrine of Chevron deference shackled judges all around the nation to the opinions of administrative actors.
Everyday Americans have not escaped Chevron’s reach unscathed. Consider the example of Thomas Buffington, a United States Air Force veteran injured in the line of duty who was later denied adequate disability payments due to a regulation issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs.
In another instance, the Board of Immigration Appeals weaponized Chevron to ignore a judicial precedent that many immigrants, like Alfonzo De Niz Robles, relied on to remain in the United States with their spouses and families. In these cases and innumerable others, Chevron has inflicted substantial harm on the American public.
This administrative deference reigned until the Supreme Court recently dethroned Chevron in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, ruling that courts, not bureaucrats, are in charge of deciding what the law means.
In Loper, the Court was asked to examine the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA). The MSA established fishery management councils allowing the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to develop regulatory plans for fishermen operating within 200 nautical miles beyond the U.S. territorial sea.
The MSA required certain fishing vessels to cover the costs of federal fishing observers. However, the MSA was unclear as to whether Atlantic herring fishermen should also be required to bear the observation costs. As a result of this ambiguity, the NMFS created a rule requiring these fishermen to pay the associated costs of complying with the regulation if federal funding was unavailable, potentially reducing their annual returns by up to 20%.
The Court recognized that allowing administrative bodies like the NMFS to arbitrarily establish these rules harms family businesses like Loper Bright Enterprises which can’t afford to comply with regulatory whiplash and disrupts the delicate separation of powers between the three branches of our federal government.
Chevron’s destructive doctrine violates the separation of powers both by (1) forcing judges to adhere to what may be an erroneous statutory interpretation simply because it comes from an agency and (2) expanding executive authority into the judicial sphere by giving unelected bureaucrats interpretive power.
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946 directs that courts are to decide what complicated laws mean and how agencies are supposed to carry out those laws. Turning to the APA and Article III of the U.S. Constitution, the Court in Loper noted that judges are responsible for resolving ambiguous terms in statutes.
When the Founders crafted our system of constitutional government, they recognized that laws passed by Congress would not always be perfectly clear. That’s why they endowed the judiciary, not the President or his surrogates, with the power to interpret complexities in statutes.
Loper returns both Congress and the Supreme Court to this constitutional framework. When bureaucrats make policy decisions that impact millions of lives, the voices of Americans meant to be represented are instead ignored. Only elected representatives accountable to the American people should be making laws, and only courts with the constitutional power to interpret them should be deciding their meaning.
The dissent in Loper complains that the Court succumbs to judicial hubris in overturning its 40-year doctrine. Part of the Court’s judicial humility, however, should lie in correcting its own mistakes. With the overturning of Chevron, the Court recognized that it must be faithful to the Constitution, even when that allegiance causes it to reconsider prior rulings.
With great respect for stare decisis (the judicial practice of letting past rulings remain), the Court must dutifully reverse its own error when a constitutional doctrine like Chevron becomes unworkable, is poor in its reasoning, and destroys reliance interests by allowing agencies that change rules on a whim to receive favor when doing so.
Everyday Americans who were disproportionately burdened by Chevron were also those least able to deal with its cumbersome effects. Because of Loper, veterans like Buffington, immigrants like Robles, and family businesses like Loper Bright Enterprises are no longer defenseless against an unrestricted regulatory state.
Katie Cassady is a rising junior at Liberty University with a double major in history and pre-law. She currently serves as the Editor-in-Chief of Liberty’s Undergraduate Law Review, Associate Justice in Student Government Association, and a national competitor in undergraduate moot court. In her spare time, she enjoys curling up with a good book or being with family and friends.
OTHER WORK BY THIS AUTHOR: “Bureaucratic Overreach” by Katie Cassady
(liberty.edu)
